

# Elections and Representation in Developing Democracies

February 12, 2017

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## 1 Overview

This course surveys recent research on elections and political representation in democracies, with a focus on topics most salient in poor and middle-income countries. Topics include political consequences of electoral rules, the organization of parties, how the territorial organization of the state affects politics, the relationship between politics and distribution, ethnicity and electoral politics, and the role of fraud and violence in elections. Note that the readings are not exclusively about politics in the non-industrialized world, but rather are chosen because of their theoretical or empirical relevance to the themes of the course. The emphasis of the class is on recent research so as to give you sense of what cutting edge work in this area looks like.

The reading list is methodologically eclectic, with research deploying a variety of types of quantitative and qualitative evidence. In addition, I deliberately included a substantial amount of formal theory. A good deal of the empirical literature draws on formal models of elections to motivate their hypotheses, so it is important to have a basic conceptual understanding of canonical models. I do not expect you to have a background in formal models and will explain all necessary concepts in class, but you may want to have a good game theory text to reference when doing the readings. I recommend the following texts if interested:

- Steven Tadelis. 2013. *Game Theory: An Introduction*. Princeton University Press (*introductory*)
- Robert Gibbons. 1992. *Game Theory for Applied Economists*. Princeton University Press (*more advanced*)
- Scott Gehlbach. 2009. *Formal Models of Domestic Politics*. Cambridge University Press (*political science applications*)

## 2 Assignments

### Reading Summaries

Each week you are required to write and circulate a 2-3 paragraph memo commenting on a theme or problem you found to be of most interest in the readings that week. I'm not looking for an essay, but rather conjectures, arguments, and critiques designed to motivate discussion. The response need not touch on all the readings, just whatever article, book, or theme that you find to be of greatest interest. This requirement is designed both to improve discussion and also serve as an accountability device for yourself to get a start on the readings. (15% of the total grade).

### Participation

Seminar discussions are the heart of the class and thus I expect everyone to participate. I reserve the right to call on you to summarize or critique the readings. Being able to talk about work that you are only barely familiar with is an important skill to have as an academic and I expect you to cultivate it in this class. (20% of the total grade)

### Papers

The paper that you write for this course should advance your scholarly career in some way. Work on what you think will be most productive, including a research design, a critical literature review, collecting a new dataset, performing a replication, or writing a full blown research paper. I am most interested in you doing something useful that will eventually contribute either to your dissertation or to a scholarly publication. To ensure that you are making timely progress on your paper, we will have the following milestones:

- Brainstorming Session: March 6 (5%)
- Progress Report: April 10 (5%)
- Class Presentation: May 8 and May 15 (20%)
- Final Paper: May 26 (35%)

### Required Books

All readings will be made available on the class website, except for the following books, which you should purchase or otherwise obtain:

- C.H. Achen and L.M. Bartels. 2016. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*. Princeton Studies in Political Behavior. Princeton University Press
- L. Blaydes. 2010. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. Cambridge University Press
- A. Simpson. 2013. *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications*. Cambridge University Press
- S.C. Stokes et al. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. Cambridge University Press

### 3 Class Schedule

#### February 13 Theory: Representation

- Chapters 1 and 2 in Adam Przeworski. 2016. “What Can We Expect of Elections?” Unpublished Manuscript
- Scott Gehlbach. 2009. *Formal Models of Domestic Politics*. Cambridge University Press (pgs 1-12, 27-35)
- Matthew Ellman and Leonard Wantchekon. 2000. “Electoral Competition Under the Threat of Political Unrest.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 115 (2): 499–531. [Link](#).

#### February 21 Theory: Accountability

- James D Fearon. 1999. “Electoral Sanctions and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types Versus Sanctioning Poor Performance.” In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes, and Bernard Manin. New York: Cambridge University Press
- Chapter 3 (sections 3.1-3.2, 3.4.3) in T. Besley. 2006. *Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government*. The Lindahl Lectures. OUP Oxford
- Sections 1-3 in Raghavendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo. 2004. “Women As Policy Makers: Evidence From a Randomized Policy Experiment in India.” *Econometrica* 72 (5): 1409–1443. [Link](#).
- Robin Harding. 2015. “Attribution And Accountability: Voting for Roads in Ghana.” *World Politics* 67, no. 4 (): 656–689. [Link](#).

#### February 27 Theory: Behavioral Models

- Chapters 1-3 in World Bank. 2014. *World Development Report 2015: Mind, Society, and Behavior*. [Link](#).
- Chapters 2, 4, 8, and 9 in C.H. Achen and L.M. Bartels. 2016. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*. Princeton Studies in Political Behavior. Princeton University Press
  - *Skim*: Anthony Fowler and Andrew Hall. 2016. *Do Shark Attacks Influence Presidential Elections? Reassessing a Prominent Finding on Voter Competence*, Working Paper. [Link](#).
- Scott Ashworth and Ethan Bueno De Mesquita. 2014. “Is Voter Competence Good for Voters?: Information, Rationality, and Democratic Performance.” *American Political Science Review* 108, no. 3 (): 565–587. [Link](#).

#### March 6 Parties

- James M. Snyder and Michael M. Ting. 2002. “An Informational Rationale for Political Parties.” *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (1): 90. [Link](#).
- Marko Klašnja and Rocio Titiunik. 2016. “The Incumbency Curse: Weak Parties, Term Limits, and Unfulfilled Accountability.” *American Political Science Review*. [Link](#).

- Adam Michael Auerbach. 2016. “Clients and Communities: The Political Economy of Party Network Organization and Development in India’s Urban Slums.” *World Politics* 68, no. 1 (): 111–148. [Link](#).
- Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee. 2000. “Capture and Governance At Local and National Levels.” *American Economic Review* 90 (2): 135–139. [Link](#).

### **March 13 Elections and the State**

- Martin Shefter. 1977. “Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy.” *Politics & Society* 7 (4): 403–451
- Alisha C. Holland. 2015. “The Distributive Politics of Enforcement.” *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (2): 357–371. [Link](#).
- Jeffrey Witsoe. 2011. “Corruption as power: Caste and the political imagination of the postcolonial state.” *American Ethnologist* 38 (1): 73–85. [Link](#).
- Diana Moreira, Laura Trucco, and Mitra Akhtari. 2016. *Political Turnover, Bureaucratic Turnover, and the Quality of Public Services*, Working Paper. [Link](#).

### **March 20 Distributive and Redistributive Politics**

- Avinash Dixit and John Londregan. 1996. “The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics.” *The Journal of Politics* 58 (4): 1132–1155. [Link](#).
- Tariq Thachil. 2014. “Elite Parties and Poor Voters: Theory and Evidence from India.” *American Political Science Review* 108, no. 2 (): 454–477. [Link](#).
- Alastair Smith and Bruce Bueno De Mesquita. 2011. “Contingent Prize Allocation and Pivotal Voting.” *British Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 02 (): 371–392. [Link](#).
- Chapters 1 and 2 in S.C. Stokes et al. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. Cambridge University Press

### **April 3 Clientelism**

- P. Keefer and R. Vlaicu. 2007. “Democracy, Credibility, and Clientelism.” *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 24 (2): 371–406. [Link](#).
- Eric Kramon. 2016. “Electoral Handouts as Information: Explaining Unmonitored Vote Buying.” *World Politics* 68, no. 3 (): 454–498. [Link](#).
- S.J. Rodrigo Zarazaga. 2014. “Brokers Beyond Clientelism: A New Perspective Through the Argentine Case.” *Latin American Politics and Society* 56 (3): 23–45. [Link](#).
- Chapters 3-5 in S.C. Stokes et al. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. Cambridge University Press

### **April 10 Ethnic Politics**

- Kanchan Chandra. 2007. “Patrons, Clients, and Policies.” Chap. Counting heads: A Theory of Voter and Elite Behavior in Patronage Democracies, edited

by Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, 84–109. Cambridge University Press (CUP)

- Kate Baldwin. 2013. “Why Vote with the Chief? Political Connections and Public Goods Provision in Zambia.” *American Journal of Political Science* (). [Link](#).
- Edward Miguel. 2004. “Tribe Or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya Versus Tanzania.” *World Politics* 56 (03): 328–362. [Link](#).
- Daron Acemoglu, Tristan Reed, and James A. Robinson. 2014. “Chiefs: Economic Development and Elite Control of Civil Society in Sierra Leone.” *Journal of Political Economy* 122 (2): 319–368. [Link](#).

### **April 24 Electoral Fraud and Election-Related Violence**

- Ashlea Rundlett and Milan W. Svobik. 2016. “Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobias in Electoral Fraud.” *American Political Science Review* 110, no. 1 (): 180–197. [Link](#).
- Walter Mebane and Allen Hicken. 2015. *A Guide to Election Forensics*, Working Paper. [Link](#).
- Chapters 1, 4, and 5 in A. Simpser. 2013. *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications*. Cambridge University Press
- Chapters 1 and 6 in S.I. Wilkinson. 2006. *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge University Press. [Link](#).

### **May 1 Elections and Representation in Authoritarian Regimes**

- Chapters 3, 4, 6, and 7 in L. Blaydes. 2010. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. Cambridge University Press
- Carles Boix and Milan W. Svobik. 2013. “The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships.” *The Journal of Politics* 75 (2): 300–316. [Link](#).
- Thomas Pepinsky. 2013. “The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism.” *British Journal of Political Science* 44 (03): 631–653. [Link](#).
- Ruben Enikolopov, Maria Petrova, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2011. “Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia.” *The American Economic Review* 101 (7): 3253–3285. [Link](#).

### **May 8 Presentations**

### **May 15 Presentations**